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INTRODUCTION
Overlapping legal claims pervade data-based innovation.  Because of its
heavily regulated status, and its potential to improve human welfare, innova-
tion based on biomedical data is a particularly notable example.
As in most other areas of innovation,1 intellectual property rights can
overlap.  Patents and trade secrecy can cover the same inventive territory sim-
ply because the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), litigants, and
courts find it excessively expensive to police the patent statute’s complex dis-
closure requirements.
Moreover, precisely how much disclosure should be required is a policy
question.  Patent cases have sometimes allowed patent applicants to claim an
invention that arises after patent filing without requiring disclosure of this
after-arising invention.  Meanwhile, the subsequent technology or informa-
tion could itself be the subject of separate intellectual property, whether
trade secrecy or an improvement patent.
While the caselaw trend has moved away from very broad rights, this
movement has not precluded “adjacent” intellectual property rights.  In these
cases, the narrower patent claims do not formally cover the follow-on innova-
tion.  However, to the extent that even patent claims of moderate scope on a
key research tool cannot be “invented around,” and the claims can be
enforced, the practical effect may be similar.
Depending on the precise nature of the follow-on innovation generated,
adjacent rights may include subsequent patents, trade secrecy, or regulatory
exclusivities administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  In
the case of biomedical data—the focus of this Article—the adjacent right
typically involves either trade secrecy or regulatory exclusivity.  Both overlap-
ping and adjacent rights have generated controversy regarding the possibility
of excessive control by the initial rights holder.
In 2012 and 2013, when cases involving diagnostic testing patents ulti-
mately brought these controversies to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court not
only struck down the individual patents involved in those cases but also sug-
gested more generally that patents on diagnostic tools might confer undue
control over future research.2  The Court used as its cudgel the argument
that the territory covered by the patents failed to constitute patent-eligible
subject matter under the so-called “law of nature” or “product of nature”
doctrines.3
While these Supreme Court cases address concern about excessive con-
trol by a single rights holder, there is an obvious flip side.  Concentrating
patent ownership in a single firm allows that firm to aggregate all of the
“adjacent” data generated through use of the patent.  With patents no longer
1 See, e.g., Symposium, Negotiating IP’s Boundaries in an Evolving World, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1421 (2017).
2 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
3 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
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serving as “data aggregators”4 in the area of diagnostic testing, the problem
of data fragmentation in this area may become even more acute.5  In diag-
nostic testing, as in other areas of biomedicine, large data sets promote
cumulative innovation.6
Notably, once biomedical data becomes fragmented, overcoming frag-
mentation creates its own legal overlap challenge.  Even with the recent
Supreme Court cases, biomedical data pooling—like pooling of scientific
data in other areas7—will face multiple intellectual property obstacles.
These include both formal intellectual property—trade secrets and narrow
patents—as well as reluctance on the part of academic researchers to share
what they view as their competitive advantage.8
Biomedical data pooling also has to overcome relatively unique chal-
lenges posed by health privacy law.  Privacy law—and related regimes of
informed consent—produce an additional set of claimants, leading some to
worry that these legal regimes will create a “tragedy of the anticommons” as
formidable as that postulated by Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg in
their discussion of the challenge of assembling fragmented patent rights.9
Scholars have suggested both private- and public-sector responses to the
pooling challenge.  On the private-sector side, some have argued in favor of
stronger individual rights.  On this view, individual consumers accorded con-
trol or even property rights over “their” health data might be incentivized to
4 See Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 233, 238 (2015); Barbara J. Evans, Mining the Human Genome After Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 16 GENETICS MED. 504, 504 (2014); see also Brenda
M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017).
5 To be sure, as discussed in Section I.A, the legacy of certain broad patents, such as
the patents at issue in Association of Molecular Pathologists v. Myriad Genetics, could act as a
limited counterforce.  But the scope of this counterforce is unclear.  Additionally, data
aggregation without some level of external access is problematic as a policy matter. See
infra Section I.A.
6 See, e.g., Eichler et al., infra note 105 and accompanying text.
7 See J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 315, 402–08 (2003) (discussing intellectual property rights claims in scientific data
silos across sectors).
8 Scholars have long discussed, and documented empirically, strong resistance to data
sharing among biomedical researchers, even on data associated with published research.
See, e.g., Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence From a
National Survey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 473, 473 (2002).  In turn, public funders have used
sticks and carrots to encourage data sharing by their grantees.  See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual
Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1187, 1196–99 (2006).
9 See Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2016) (quoting Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998)); see also Michael Mattioli, Data Pools, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing the pooling of data silos as an “anticommons”
problem more generally).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL408.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-MAY-17 15:32
1644 notre dame law review [vol. 92:4
create pools.10  While proposals for some level of consumer control are inter-
esting, according millions of individuals property rights in data is likely to
exacerbate transaction cost problems, not resolve them.
Other scholars have highlighted the potential role of institutional pri-
vate-sector players like insurance companies.11  The increasing interest
shown by insurance firms in using claims data to determine the therapeutic
value of medical interventions they cover is a positive development.  How-
ever, it is not clear that insurance firms would necessarily be motivated to
create pools across firm boundaries.
As for the public sector, many scholars (myself included) have discussed
mechanisms by which public funders of data resource creation can exercise
informal or formal regulatory power to promote data pooling.12  But public-
sector funding is always a scarce resource.
One set of regulatory actors that have received less attention than they
merit is risk regulators.13  In the data pooling context, risk regulators are part
of the problem.  But they are also part of the solution.
On the one hand, aggressive moves by risk regulators to control per-
ceived risks to privacy may impair possibilities for pooling.  More positively,
for a significant set of biomedical data—all pre-approval biopharmaceutical
data and a significant subset of diagnostic data—risk regulators like the FDA
are the default data aggregators.  They can use this status to promote innova-
tion based on pooled data.
The recent history of the FDA’s role in addressing rights-encumbered
biopharmaceutical clinical trial data silos highlights both the agency’s prom-
ise and its limitations as a promoter of data-based innovation infrastructure.
This history also highlights the status of data as a global public good, with
10 Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data Commons and the
Transformation of Citizen Science, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2017) (consumer-driven
pools with rights determined by pool members); see also Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and
the Pursuit of Interconnected Health Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631 (2010) (advocating property
rights in data); Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Unpatients—Why Patients Should Own Their
Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECH. 921 (2015) (same).
11 Rebecca Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the
Demand Side (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 503, 2016) (arguing that claims
data as well as electronic health records be used to determine “real-world” efficacy of
biomedical interventions).
12 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the State, in
GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann et al., eds. forthcoming
2017); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003) (addressing NIH legal requirements for the pooling of
biomedical data created with federal funding).
13 For earlier articles that do focus on the FDA, see infra sources cited in note 104.
Scholars have also talked about the role of the FDA in promoting drug safety through the
creation of post-marketing data infrastructure. See, e.g., Barbara Evans, Congress’ New Infras-
tructural Model of Medical Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585 (2009).  In the post-marketing
context, however, the risk regulator does not necessarily have a significant amount of con-
trol over the data.
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FDA action being supplemented, and arguably superseded, by the actions of
its European counterpart, the European Medicines Agency (EMA).14
The data exclusivity administered by risk regulators in the United States
and other advanced economies emerges as an attractive mechanism for bal-
ancing the interests of initial and subsequent data generators.  Indeed, for
purposes of promoting data pooling, the temporal overlap between patents
and data exclusivity is a feature, not a bug.  A similar regime of exclusivity for
diagnostic data would be worth considering.
Data exclusivity does not address legal claims that emerge from the law
of health privacy and informed consent.  These regimes raise major transac-
tion cost challenges, particularly to the extent data holders cannot guarantee
that de-identified or anonymized data is impervious to re-identification.
Unfortunately, U.S. risk regulators’ recent tool of choice for addressing
potentially identifiable data—broad consent to any future research use—pro-
vides a suboptimal response.  Broad consent is superior to any attempt to
confer property rights on raw data inputs that will be provided by millions of
different individuals.  But it is inferior to a pragmatic approach that empha-
sizes sanctions for illegitimate re-identification and protecting those whose
data is used from harm.
On balance, the contribution of risk regulators has been mixed.  To
some extent, risk regulators, particularly in Europe, have capitalized on their
pivotal aggregation role to address the challenges posed by rights-encum-
bered data silos.  However, even in the political environment of the Obama
Administration—where the White House was a prominent advocate of open
government data,15 and generally viewed regulatory activity as compatible
with, or even a promoter of, innovation16—U.S. risk regulators were
cautious.
In elucidating the role of risk regulators, this Article contributes another
chapter to the rich legal and economic literature discussing whether, and
how, risk and social regulation can promote socially valuable innovation.17
14 Cf. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that the
European Union can promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal
frameworks of other countries).
15 Exec. Order No. 13,642, 3 C.F.R. pt. 100 (May 9, 2013) (titled “Making Open and
Machine Readable the New Default for Government Information”).
16 Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 3, 3 C.F.R. pt. 100 (Jan. 18, 2011) (titled “Improving Reg-
ulation and Regulatory Review” and requiring that “[e]ach agency shall also seek to iden-
tify, as appropriate, means to achieve regulatory goals that are designed to promote
innovation”).
17 The economic literature is particularly voluminous.  For a literature review across
different industries, see Luke A. Stewart, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the
United States: A Cross-Industry Literature Review (June 2010) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with Info. Tech. & Innovation Found.).  For discussions in the legal literature, see,
e.g., Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to
Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781 (2015); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing
Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008); Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345
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As contrasted with much of this literature, however, the focus here is not on
innovation induced by efforts to comply with regulation but instead on regu-
lation as a force for creating a data infrastructure for future innovation.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the history of overlapping and
adjacent intellectual property rights in biomedical innovation.  It then dis-
cusses the manner in which the Supreme Court’s reaction to such rights con-
centration may exacerbate legally-encumbered diagnostic data silos.  Part II
outlines the basic history of biopharmaceutical trial data silos as well as the
core legal and policy arguments in favor of increasing access to the aggre-
gated data held by risk regulators.  It then discusses recent developments,
including the stance taken by European risk regulators.  Part III discusses
lessons from the biopharmaceutical trial data experience and how some of
these lessons may play out in current debates over diagnostic testing silos and
overlapping rights.
I. BIOMEDICAL DATA: CHALLENGES OF CONCENTRATION AND FRAGMENTATION
A. Overlapping, Adjacent, and Fragmented Intellectual Property Rights
Both inadvertently and by design, overlapping and adjacent intellectual
property rights pervade biomedical innovation.  As an initial matter, patents
and trade secrecy can overlap.  To be sure, the text of the patent statute—
which requires that a patent document’s disclosure show the ordinary scien-
tist or technologist working in the area how to make and use the claimed
invention18—appears to frown on direct overlap.  So does the language of
certain Supreme Court cases.19  As a practical matter, however, because of
institutional limitations within the USPTO and other patent-granting institu-
tions, patent disclosure is often inadequate.  Additionally, because the invali-
dation of a bad patent represents a public good from which all competitors
benefit,20 competitor attempts to mount challenges to patents are likely to be
undersupplied.  Undersupply of disclosure-based challenges may be particu-
larly likely because proving inadequate disclosure can be highly fact-intensive
and complex.
More fundamentally, patent law has an ambivalent relationship with full
disclosure.  For example, the law allows patentees to impose on those who
wish to use the disclosure some burden of experimentation, so long as it is
(2007); William W. Fisher III, Regulating Innovation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 251
(2016); Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2007); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and
Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981).
18 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (requiring that a patent “contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . .
to make and use the same”).
19 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (“Trade secret
law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach . . . .”).
20 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 333.
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not “undue.”21  Some level of less than comprehensive disclosure might be
justified on the grounds that the law wants to encourage potential users to
engage in ex ante licensing that gives them access to this additional disclo-
sure rather than ex post settlement of infringement claims.22
In addition, patent caselaw has sometimes indicated that claims can,
consistent with the disclosure requirements of the patent statute, cover tech-
nology that did not exist when the claim was filed.  One famous example,
decided by the Federal Circuit in 1989, involved a patent that broadly
claimed a new polymer that it termed crystalline polypropylene.23  At the
time the patent application was filed, the term crystalline polypropylene was
understood in light of the type of molecule the applicant had identified—a
polymer of low viscosity and low molecular weight.24  In contrast, by the time
the patent was asserted, the crystalline polypropylene art encompassed
polymers of high viscosity and high molecular weight.25  The Federal Circuit
held that because the adequacy of the patent’s disclosure was judged in rela-
tion to the state of the art at the time of patent filing, the patent was valid.26
Its scope was not, however, limited to the date of patent filing—thus, the
patent claim encompassed the later-invented polymers.27
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of crystalline polypropylene is consistent
with an economic vision, famously advocated by Edmund Kitch,28 that pat-
ents are usefully analogized to mining prospects and should therefore claim
21 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–42 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Scholarly commentators have
also debated at length how important full disclosure is, or should be, to the patent system.
See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV 539 (2009); Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2012).  Indeed,
a recent issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review focuses exclusively on this question. See Sympo-
sium, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2016).  In his contri-
bution to this issue, Nicholson Price argues for an “economic enablement” standard that
would go well beyond current doctrinal requirements. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired
Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611 (2017).  Price
uses as an example of economic enablement the possibility that firms with diagnostic pat-
ents would be required, after the patent has expired, to disclose genetic variant data
revealed through use of the patent. Id. at 1632–34, 1640.
22 Relatedly, to the extent that full disclosure includes transfer of know-how that is
difficult to codify, ex ante patent licensing may provide an efficient mechanism for trans-
ferring this know-how. See ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOM-
ICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 116–18 (2001) (discussing patents as rights
that a licensor can use as a “hostage” against misappropriation of know-how by the
licensee).
23 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also
In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
24 See U.S. Steel, 865 F.2d at 1250.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1252.
27 Id. at 1250–52.
28 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL408.txt unknown Seq: 8  2-MAY-17 15:32
1648 notre dame law review [vol. 92:4
large areas of research territory yet to be mined.29  Kitch’s theory does not
envision the possibility of improvement patents within the scope of the domi-
nant patent.  Thus, it would presumably create overlap only between patents
and trade secrecy.  As it happens, however, because black letter patent law
allows improvement patents within the scope of the dominant patent,30 over-
lapping patents are equally possible.  These overlapping patents may be held
by the same, or different, owners.
In recent years, the Federal Circuit’s newfound emphasis on the so-
called written description language found in section 112 of the patent statute
has caused some reduction in complete overlap.31  According to the Federal
Circuit, written description requires that the patent filer show possession of
the technology claimed at the time the patent was filed.  Possession is gener-
ally defined through structure, and an expansive claim construction that goes
beyond the structures that existed at the time of filing can render the patent
invalid.  Thus, for example, some prominent Federal Circuit cases—includ-
ing the court’s en banc 2010 decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly
& Co.32—have wielded written description to strike down patent claims that
purport to cover not only identified structures (e.g., a receptor) involved in a
disease process but also as-yet undiscovered drugs that could work to modu-
late the receptor.33
From the standpoint of those wary of overlapping rights, written descrip-
tion is only a partial solution, however.  First, challenges based on written
description can be difficult for courts to understand and expensive to mount.
Second, in at least some cases, even a relatively narrow patent on a key
research tool may not be susceptible to “inventing around” by a potential
competitor.  In that case, the patent on the tool may create “adjacent” rights
on follow-on innovation that uses the tool.34
29 For a recent analysis of Federal Circuit cases allowing applicants to claim technology
that has not yet been invented, see for example Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-
Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009).
30 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
31 Certain cases tightening the enablement requirement may have also reduced over-
lap. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 877–78
(2017) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has recently applied enablement in a manner that
requires patentees to claim narrowly).
32 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Abbvie Deutschland GMBH & Co.
v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoS-
mithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
33 For an empirical review of the use of written description across a range of technolo-
gies, see John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definite-
ness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609 (2016).  Even with greater use of written description,
dominant patents overlap remains a feature of U.S. law.  Product patents dominate all
subsequently discovered uses.  They also prohibit making or using the claimed product
even when it is made by a vastly different method. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
34 A recent article by Brenda Simon and Ted Sichelman discusses a specific subset of
this challenge—the case of “data-generating patents.” See Simon & Sichelman, supra note
4.
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For example, to the extent it could be enforced against infringers, even
a relatively narrow patent claim to an important cell receptor could create a
zone of adjacent rights in the molecules that modulate that receptor.
Indeed, the heated debate over patents on research tools and platform tech-
nologies—and the corresponding debate over the need for a general-pur-
pose research exemption35—was fueled in part by concern about adjacent
rights.
As it happens, because many research tool patent owners were either
unable or unwilling to enforce their rights, concerns about excessive control
were mitigated.36  But when patentees did enforce their rights—as they
sometimes did on diagnostic patents37—controversy flared well beyond the
relatively insular boundaries of the patent world.
Two cases, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.38 and
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,39 brought these con-
troversies to the attention of the Supreme Court.  In both cases, the Court
unanimously struck down patents that the challengers and their allies argued
created chilling effects for follow-on research.  In the Mayo case, Justice
Breyer discussed at length undue preemption of follow-on research as a rea-
son to invalidate the patents.40  Although Justice Breyer’s opinion did not
specifically discuss adjacent rights over data, the preemptive effect would pre-
sumably encompass adjacent rights over data generated by the diagnostic
test.  The Court used as its guide to undue preemption whether the subject
matter claimed constitutes a law or product of nature under section 101 of
the patent statute.41
Many commentators (myself included) have argued that the Court failed
to articulate how section 101 overlaps with, or is distinct from, other inquiries
within the patent statute that govern patent scope (and hence preemption)
or, indeed, the ability to secure a patent in the first instance.42  As noted,
however, unlike the fact-intensive and complex inquiries required by other
35 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experi-
mental Use Exemption From United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University
and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Katherine J.
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 81.  U.S. law does include an exemption for any patent infringement that arises in the
context of research “reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the . . . use . . . of drugs . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
36 John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innova-
tion, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 286 (Wesley M Cohen & Stephen
A. Merrill eds., 2003).
37 See, e.g., id. at 306.
38 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
39 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
40 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
41 Id. at 1293.
42 See Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 111 (2013).
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sections of the patent statute, a section 101 inquiry is considered a question
of law and thus can be deployed early and inexpensively by the USPTO, by
patent challengers, and by courts.  Indeed, the empirical evidence thus far
suggests significant use of section 101 to reject patents in areas related to
diagnostics, even at the resource-constrained USPTO.43
Although the effects of Mayo and Myriad require further empirical study,
plausible effects may include fewer patents and/or substantially narrower
patent claims.  Additionally, firms may further emphasize secrecy for diagnos-
tic research tools.  Both narrower claims and secrecy will presumably create
more data fragmentation.  Moreover, like all data, this fragmented diagnostic
data will be subject to claims of trade secrecy protection under both long-
standing state trade secret law and now the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA).44
In a few cases, the legacy effect of patents now deemed invalid may miti-
gate fragmentation.  For example, the BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostic gene-
testing patenting portfolio has given Myriad Genetics a database of test
results from about 1.5 million patients.45  According to recent press
accounts, the Myriad database has 17,000 BRCA variants in its proprietary
database, and 46,000 gene variants in total.46  However, even in the case of
Myriad, this legacy effect has not forestalled substantial competition.47  In
any event, as many commentators have noted, data aggregation that main-
tains indefinite secrecy is far from ideal.  Although entities that hold aggre-
gated data can do research, the credibility of this research will be limited by
the fact that they cannot release the data that undergirds the research.48
43 See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Personalized-Medicine Takes Hit: U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
Seem to Drive Patent Rejections, 536 NATURE 382 (2016) (discussing preliminary results from a
study of USPTO rejections).
44 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832–39, 1961).  Without eliminating or preempting state trade secret
rights, the DTSA makes the federal courts available for parties to bring civil actions for
misappropriation of trade secrets.  Under both the DTSA and the state law adopted by
almost every state, the information in question must neither be known nor readily ascer-
tainable by competitors, and it must derive economic value from such secrecy.  The owner
must also have taken reasonable measures to maintain secrecy.  This definition is capacious
enough to allow claims that siloed data qualifies as a trade secret.  Trade secrets are pro-
tected against “misappropriation,” which is essentially a tort-type action wherein the
accused party acquires the trade secret by improper means such as theft, bribery, misrepre-
sentation, breach, or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.
45 Joseph Walker, Myriad Genetics Fights off Threats From Rivals, WALL ST. J. (May 3,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/myriad-genetics-fights-off-threats-from-rivals-14306455
82.
46 Turna Ray, Genomic Variant Data Sharing Gains Support; Collaboration Seen as Key to
Interpretation Challenge, GENOME WEB (May 2, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/infor
matics/genomic-variant-data-sharing-gains-support-collaboration-seen-key-interpretation.
47 See id.
48 Several recent articles address the question of whether, and how, law should address
large legacy silos such as the Myriad silo. See, e.g., Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next
Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 585
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But patents and trade secrecy are not the only legal regimes relevant to
data.  In addition, complex legal regimes governing health information pri-
vacy and informed consent create a plethora of legal hurdles.  The next Sec-
tion outlines these hurdles.
B. Diagnostic Data Silos: Beyond Intellectual Property Rights
In the context of human biomedical data, legal regimes conferring
informed consent and privacy protections overlap with intellectual property
claims, thereby further fortifying silos.  Modern law governing human-sub-
jects research originates in a number of troubling twentieth-century research
scandals, including a notorious study (“the Tuskegee study”) in which
researchers from the U.S. Public Health Service observed the progression of
syphilis in poor African-American research participants without informing
them of the fact they had the disease or of available treatments.49  Accord-
ingly, both the Common Rule that governs federally-funded human-subjects
research,50 and separate regulation for clinical trials subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the FDA,51 place a high premium on informed consent.52
Notably, human-subjects research regulations apply not only to interven-
tional research involving interactions between a researcher and a living indi-
vidual but also to secondary research on human data and biospecimens that
have already been collected.  Many commentators have noted that rules gov-
erning interventional research, which involves a risk of physical harm, do not
necessarily function well when exported to the realm of purely informational
research.53  Even so, the Common Rule continues to govern such research.54
In the context of informational research, the relevant risk is breach of pri-
vacy, with attendant potential for harmful action by employers, insurers, law
enforcement, and other institutions that receive access to the data.
Following this logic, the Common Rule exempts informational research
if the relevant information has been “recorded by the investigator in such a
(2013); Barbara J. Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 51 (2014); Simon & Sichelman, supra note 4.  This Article focuses on the indefinite
secrecy currently maintained by the FDA in the context of its data aggregation.
49 See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD (2d ed. 1993).
50 See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2009).
51 See Protection of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2011).
52 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (FDA regulation); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (Common Rule).
53 See, e.g., INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 7 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009) (“[I]n informa-
tion-based research that relies solely on medical records and stored biospecimens, the
research participant faces no risk of direct physical harm.”).
54 Existing law also places stricter restrictions on the secondary use of data for research
than on its use in other contexts, such as public health practice.  Stricter regulation of
research use is grounded in the view that research, unlike other uses, aims for generaliz-
able knowledge and does not purport directly to benefit research participants. See, e.g.,
Evans, supra note 13, at 615–19.  Whether the law should draw sharp distinctions between
different uses of data is an important question, but one that is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers
linked to the subjects.”55  Similarly, the Privacy Rule promulgated pursuant
to the Health Information Privacy and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996
allows a  “covered entity” (e.g., a provider or health insurance plan) that
seeks to transfer data for research purposes to do so if the data has been
subject to “de-identification.”56
Because of the need for removal of identifiers, compliance with the
Common Rule and the HIPAA Privacy Rule imposes a tax on sharing data.
At least for certain types of data, this tax can be relatively modest, however.57
Indeed, removal of identifying information, and contractual prohibitions
against re-identification, have been the mechanism by which some promi-
nent efforts at pooling clinical trial data have negotiated privacy and
informed consent hurdles.  For example, the Clinical Study Data Repository
(CSDR), a private-sector platform that gives researchers access to patient-
level clinical trial data from over a dozen pharmaceutical firms, is able to do
so because it has “anonymized” the data, and requires researchers who access
the data to refrain from re-identification.58  Moreover, as discussed in Part II,
the EMA is currently focusing on data sets that do not appear to create signif-
icant re-identification issues.
Going forward, the more significant challenge for pooling under the
current Common Rule/HIPAA regime is the concern that certain types of
important health information, particularly genomic information, are quite
susceptible to re-identification.  A number of scientific researchers have pub-
lished articles demonstrating re-identification based on genomic data.59
Indeed, the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP)—the compo-
nent of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible
for administering the Common Rule—has proposed revising the rule to
require written consent for secondary research on all biospecimens, even
55 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4).
56 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule has a two-pronged method for deeming information “de-iden-
tified.”  Either a person “with appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally
accepted statistical and scientific principles” must certify the information de-identified or a
list of identifiers identified in the Rule must be removed. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)
(2016).
57 For example, according to Johnson & Johnson, which is supporting the Yale Open
Data Access project, the annual cost of maintaining a secure computer infrastructure is 200
to 330 times that of de-identifying data from a clinical trial.  E-mail from Karla Childers,
Senior Dir. of Strategic Projects, Johnson & Johnson, Inc., to Arti K. Rai (July 20, 2016) (on
file with author).  In cases where de-identification makes data less usable as a scientific
matter, the tax is greater.
58 Data Sharing Agreement, CLINICAL STUDY DATA REPOSITORY, https://clinical-
studydatarequest.com/DataSharingAgreement.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (noting
anonymization and requiring researchers who use data to refrain from re-identification).
59 See, e.g., Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339
SCIENCE 321 (2013); Nils Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of
DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, 4 PLOS GENET-
ICS e1000167, e1000167 (2008); see also John Bohannon, Genealogy Databases Enable Naming
of Anonymous DNA Donors, 339 SCIENCE 262, 262 (2013) (summarizing studies).
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specimens that are considered nonidentifiable according to traditional stan-
dards.60  Instead of allowing for an exemption based on de-identification, the
proposed rule would encourage researchers who collect biospecimens to
seek broad consent for all future research uses.61
For its part, the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) appears to have
already decided that it does not consider any type of genomic data exempt
from the consent requirement.  NIH’s “Genomic Data Sharing Policy,” pub-
lished on August 28, 2014,62 states that NIH “expects investigators generating
genomic data to seek consent from participants for future research uses and
the broadest possible sharing.”63  As justification for its position, NIH’s policy
statement highlights the aforementioned research studies demonstrating re-
identification.64
In theory, standardized, broad consent might appropriately respect pri-
vacy without imposing large transaction costs.65  However, as the NIH policy
statement itself acknowledges, research participants may not necessarily
agree to such broad consent, “potentially biasing studies if certain popula-
tions were less likely to consent to broad use of their data.”66  For this reason,
NIH states that it will “continue to accept data from studies with consents
that stipulate limitations on future uses and sharing.”67  But merging data
gathered under multiple different consent terms is likely to pose significant
transaction cost challenges.
Additionally, as discussed further below, both the NIH approach and the
proposed Common Rule approach appear to give up too readily on imper-
fect de-identification and anonymization.  They fail to recognize contexts in
which data pooling is unlikely to result in re-identification or the alternative
of concerted efforts to deter illegitimate re-identification.  Indeed, a recent
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report was quite critical of the pro-
posed Common Rule revision, suggesting instead a system of “explicit sanc-
tions against investigators and institutions seeking to re-identify biospecimen
60 See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,936
(proposed Sept. 8, 2015).
61 Id.
62 Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345 (Aug. 28, 2014).
63 Id. at 51,347.
64 Id. (noting that the “evolution of genomic technology and analytical methods raises
the risk of re-identification”).  Notably, NIH practices with respect to biological specimens
and genomic data have also been put under scrutiny by journalist accounts highlighting
the absence of informed consent in the circumstances under which cancer cells were taken
in 1951 from a biopsy of Henrietta Lacks’s tumor and transformed into the now famous
research tools known as the HeLa cell lines.  Ewen Callaway, Deal Done over HeLa Cell Line,
500 NATURE 132 (2013).
65 Some empirical studies suggest that research participants value autonomy and con-
sent highly. See S.B. Trinidad et al., Research Practice and Participant Preferences: The Growing
Gulf, 331 SCIENCE 287 (2011).  Thus, seeking broad consent is arguably consistent with
participant preferences.
66 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,347.
67 Id.
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sources by any method, including linkage of genomic sequence data to
identifiers.”68
On the positive side, we also have a partial precedent—biopharmaceuti-
cal clinical trial data—in which risk regulators and data exclusivity adminis-
tered by risk regulators figure prominently.  As discussed in Part III, because
the regulatory footprint in diagnostics is currently lighter than in therapeu-
tics, the precedent is only partial.  However, to the extent that safety concerns
ultimately lead to a heavier regulatory footprint in diagnostics,
biopharmaceutical trial data demonstrates the promise, and limits, of risk
regulators as promoters of data pooling.  Additionally, the mechanisms by
which risk regulators have assisted biopharmaceutical data pooling are, on
their own terms, important illustrations of the manner in which well-crafted
regulatory regimes can promote innovation.
The next Part turns to biopharmaceutical trial data.
68 COMM. ON FED. RESEARCH REGULATIONS & REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, NAT’L ACAD.
OF SCIS., OPTIMIZING THE NATION’S INVESTMENT IN ACADEMIC RESEARCH 166 (2016) [herein-
after NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., OPTIMIZING], http://www.nap.edu/21824; see also Contreras,
supra note 9.  That said, from a transaction cost perspective, informed consent is much
preferable to the alternative, intermittently advocated over the decades, of granting indi-
vidual “sources” property rights over biospecimens or data inputs. See generally JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1996) (discussing the question of property rights
for “sources” in contexts ranging from plant genetic resources to cell lines).  For a recent
proposal advocating property rights in medical record health data specifically, see for
example Hall, supra note 10; Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical
Information, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1282, 1284 (2009).
Perhaps most notably, unlike property rights violations, allegations of a breach of
informed consent do not yield remedies against third parties.  Indeed, the famous Califor-
nia Supreme Court case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, involving cell lines
over which the plaintiff claimed a property interest, accepted Moore’s arguments regard-
ing breach of informed consent but rejected his conversion claim in significant part
because of concerns regarding third-party researchers.  793 P.2d 479, 480, 494 (Cal. 1990)
(en banc).  More generally, as many commentators have noted, because of regulators’ con-
cerns about impeding downstream research, federal and state law generally refuses to rec-
ognize property rights in excised biological material and related data. See, e.g., R. Alta
Charo, Body of Research—Ownership and Use of Human Tissue, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517,
1518 (2006); Rina Hakimian & David Korn, Ownership and Use of Tissue Specimens for
Research, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2500, 2500 (2004).  To be sure, as Jorge Contreras has
recently emphasized, defendants might choose to settle lawsuits involving claims including
breach of informed consent through actions that resemble property rule remedies.  See
Contreras, supra note 9, at 20–23.  Thus, for example, in several lawsuits alleging state
common-law breach of informed consent claims against researchers, defendants agreed to
settlement terms that destroyed or returned the biological samples in their possession.
However, a defendant’s choice to use remedies sounding in property rules (presumably
because it would prefer not to pay large monetary damages) is not equivalent to court
imposition of that remedy.
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II. AGGREGATING BIOPHARMACEUTICAL TRIAL DATA
A. Biopharmaceutical Trial Data in the United States:
Basic History, Law, and Policy
In order to enter the U.S. market, biopharmaceuticals must be approved
by the FDA.  In general, approval requires the submission of clinical trial data
showing that the product in question is safe and effective.  When generated
by a private developer, biopharmaceutical trial data starts out as the devel-
oper’s trade secret.  The question of how a submission to the FDA changes
the data’s legal status is complex.  Adding to the complexity, the legal regime
for “large molecule” biologics data is different from, and less clear than, that
for small molecule data.  For clarity of exposition, I focus on small molecule
drug data.
Historically, the FDA has taken the position that under both its organic
statute, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),69 as well as under the
Trade Secrets Act (TSA)70 that applies to all federal agencies, it is prohibited
from releasing drug trial data.71  Furthermore, in rulemaking done in 1974
to implement the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the agency con-
cluded that it was not “feasible or practical to determine the differences, if
any,” between what the agency is prohibited from disclosing under the FDCA
and the TSA and what it is permitted to withhold from disclosure after a citizen
request under FOIA.72  Thus, the FDA’s 1974 rule on what it is prohibited
from disclosing largely mirrors the broad language of FOIA Exemption 4.
The rule states that “[d]ata and information submitted or divulged to the
Food and Drug Administration which fall within the definitions of a trade
secret or confidential commercial or financial information are not available
for public disclosure.”73
With respect to the FDCA, which specifically bars the FDA from
revealing only “any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to
protection,”74 the FDA’s position appears overly conservative.75  And even
with respect to the TSA, which covers both “trade secrets” and “confidential
statistical data,” this statute notes the caveat of disclosure being permissible if
“authorized by law.”76  Other agencies have taken the caveat to mean that, in
69 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
70 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012).
71 See 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,634–35 (Dec. 24, 1974) (stating that the FDA’s position
under the FDCA dates back to 1938 and that the Commissioner further concludes that the
TSA precludes disclosure).
72 Id. at 44,612.
73 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (2016) (formerly codified at 21 C.F.R. § 4.61(c)).
74 21 U.S.C. § 331(j).
75 This point was made to the FDA in the 1974 FOIA rulemaking, but the agency
rejected it on the grounds that it did not want to alter an interpretation it had maintained
since 1938.  39 Fed. Reg. at 44,634–35.
76 Specifically, the TSA prohibits federal employees from releasing “to any extent not
authorized by law” information they receive that relates to “trade secrets” or “confidential
statistical data.”  18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012).
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those cases where their delegated authority gives them authority to promul-
gate rules that represent binding law, they may disclose information other-
wise encompassed by the TSA by promulgating such rules.  This
interpretation of the TSA caveat was endorsed by the Supreme Court in its
1979 decision Chrysler Corp. v. Brown.77  This case also held that the TSA does
not prohibit agencies from disclosing information that the agency may per-
missibly exempt under FOIA.78
Whatever its legal merits, prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act
of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman”),79 the FDA’s conservative position may have been
justified as a policy matter.80  As commentators have noted, molecules that
might be promising drug candidates cannot always be reliably patented.81
Assuming no patents barred the action, competitors might have been able to
use released data to immediately submit their own marketing applications
(known as new drug applications, or NDAs).
The economic and legal calculus changed after the passage of Hatch-
Waxman.  Under the statute, an originator’s small molecule clinical trial data
receives a five-year period of exclusive use post-marketing.82  Competitors
must wait for that period to expire before they can market drugs that rely on
the originators’ data as evidence of the safety and effectiveness of their own
“bioequivalent” molecule.83
Notably, in section 355(l) of Hatch-Waxman, Congress appears to have
recognized this change of economic calculus.  That section directs the FDA
to make clinical trial data on approved NDAs available upon request to the
public after the expiration of the exclusivity period “unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances are shown.”84  Hatch-Waxman also states that clinical trial data
77 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
78 Id. at 316–17.
79 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585.
80 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, in THE LAW
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 467, 469
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (making this argument).
81 Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 503, 504 (2009).
82 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act § 101(j)(4)(D)(ii).
83 This five-year period applies both to drugs that are generic copies as well as drugs
submitted under the so-called 505(b)(2) pathway.  Drugs submitted under 505(b)(2) rely
only in part on the innovator data. Id. § 103(a).
84 21 U.S.C. § 355(l)(1), (1)(E) (2012) (“Safety and effectiveness data and informa-
tion which has been submitted in an [NDA] for a drug and which has not previously been
disclosed to the public shall be made available to the public, upon request, unless
extraordinary circumstances are shown . . . upon the effective date of the approval of the
first [abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)] which refers to such drug or upon the
date upon which the approval of an [ANDA] which refers to such drug could be made
effective if such an application had been submitted.”).
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on drugs whose NDA has been irrevocably rejected should be made available
absent “extraordinary circumstances.”85
More generally, even absent an affirmative request by a member of the
public, data exclusivity providing protection that survives disclosure would
appear to obviate the need to maintain secrecy over the data.  Additionally,
this type of data exclusivity now exists in most major jurisdictions that require
clinical data for market entry.86  As in the United States, it attaches upon
marketing and runs concurrently with any patent protection.
Those who resist data release have argued that such release might none-
theless damage the originator firm’s competitive prospects in countries that
lack regulatory protection for data.87  On this argument, competitors could
take the data package released and use it immediately to compete with the
originator in those countries.88  However, as documented in a 2015 Institute
of Medicine (IOM) report discussing clinical trial data sharing,89 many of
these countries require little or no data submission in any event, instead rely-
ing largely on the approval of the drug by the FDA or EMA.  In these coun-
tries, the barrier (if any) to generic competition is patent protection secured
by the originator firm, not trial data.90  In any event, as prescribed by section
355(l) of Hatch-Waxman, the regulator might release data after the exclusiv-
ity period in its jurisdiction has expired, thereby providing more secure pro-
tection to the initial data generator.91
Even after Hatch-Waxman, the FDA resisted efforts at data release.  In a
1999 case where Public Citizen Health Research Group invoked section
355(l) to argue for data release, the agency took the dubious position that
the statutory language allowed it to withhold the same information that it was
85 Id. § 355(l)(1)(A)–(C).  For its part, the FDA has promulgated regulations that mir-
ror the language of the statute. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (1999) (discussing exclusivity
in regulations promulgated by the FDA).
86 See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP L.
REV. 1 (2009) (discussing data exclusivity regimes in different jurisdictions).
87 SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA, supra note *, at 260.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 261.
90 Id.  These countries, which are found largely in the developing world, understanda-
bly make tradeoffs between access and innovation incentives different from those made in
richer countries.
91 Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 102, 98 Stat. 1585, 1592 (1984).  As discussed below, the EMA
policy does not delay release.  Instead, it requires those who access the data to sign a con-
tract stating that they will not use the data for purposes of pursuing marketing
applications.
Biopharmaceutical firms have also argued that commercially sensitive information
other than safety and effectiveness data might be included in the clinical study reports
(CSRs) submitted to regulators.  This information could include company strategies for
dealing with regulators, strategies for conducting future clinical trials, and potential
exploratory endpoints.  This information should, however, be susceptible to segregation
and redaction.  The EMA policy, discussed below, operates accordingly.
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permitted to withhold under Exemption 4 of FOIA.92  The FDA’s stance
appears to have chilled subsequent attempts to invoke section 355(l).93
B. Recent Developments at the FDA and EMA
In the United States, Congress ultimately acted to mandate regulatory
action on data release.  Activity and discussion began in earnest after a very
prominent scandal surrounding Merck’s suppression of adverse event data
with respect to the drug Vioxx.94  Indeed, “[a]ccording to the bill’s sponsors,
[the] drug provisions” of the 2007 FDA Amendments Act (FDAAA) “were a
direct reaction to the Vioxx scandal.”95  The Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 199796 had previously mandated registration in Clini-
calTrials.gov of federally or privately-funded clinical trials.97  FDAAA went a
significant step further, requiring reporting of summary results from non-
phase 1 trials of FDA-approved drugs, biologics and devices, whether or not
the results had been published.98  These summary results include demo-
graphic and baseline characteristics of the patient sample as well as primary
and secondary outcomes.
Summary results are useful, even more so if (as has recently occurred)
requirements to release summary results encompass trial results from drugs
that are either not the subject of an NDA or are ultimately not approved.99
But the goals of aggregation are better served through access to more
detailed information.  One level of greater detail is the clinical study report
(CSR), which is submitted to regulators as part of an NDA.100  CSRs, which
92 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).  The district court in that case rejected the FDA’s position, arguing that it was
contrary to the statutory language under step one of Chevron. Id. at 900.  The appellate
court determined it did not have to decide the question because section 355(l) did not
cover the type of data (investigational new drug application data rather than data on an
approved or rejected NDA) sought by Public Citizen. Id. at 903.
93 A search of Westlaw for cases discussing section 355(l) yielded no results after 1999.
94 Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food
and Drug Legislation in the United States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599, 614–16 (2009).
95 Id. at 616.
96 Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296.
97 Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat. 823, 904–22 (2007).  Registration requirements
include a brief summary, intended for the lay public; a discussion of the trial’s primary
purpose and design; the intervention name and intervention type; target number of sub-
jects; and outcomes, including primary and secondary outcome measures. Id.
§ 801(j)(2)(A)(ii), 121 Stat. 823, 906.
98 See Deborah A. Zarin et al., Issues in the Registration of Clinical Trials, 297 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2112, 2113 (2007); Deborah A. Zarin et al., The ClinicalTrials.gov Results Database—
Update and Key Issues, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 852 (2011).
99 The FDAAA authorizes HHS to promulgate regulations that expand the set of
results that must be reported to include failed trials, and HHS has recently promulgated
final regulations along these lines.  Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information
Submission, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,982, 64,982 (Sept. 21, 2016).
100 See International Conference on Harmonisation; Guideline on Structure and Con-
tent of Clinical Study Reports; Availability, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,320 (July 17, 1996).
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are standardized across major regulatory jurisdictions, often run into the
hundreds of pages, providing detailed descriptions of the trial, clinical end
points, methods, and key data.101  Data at the level of the individual patient
goes one step further, potentially revealing flaws in the CSR.102
While proponents of clinical trial data release initially focused on a very
specific type of innovation—policing erroneous or even fraudulent claims
about safety and efficacy103—they subsequently came to realize that tech-
niques for analyzing data had improved to the point where aggregated data
could create a more general-purpose innovation infrastructure.104  Specifi-
cally, release of large amounts of data—including data on biopharmaceuti-
cals that have failed either in clinical trials or at the FDA approval stage—
could be invaluable for improving future clinical trial design, avoiding dupli-
cative clinical trials on biopharmaceuticals, conducting subgroup analyses
that highlight new research directions (e.g., the possibility that an approved
or failed drug might have a new use in a particular population), and con-
ducting comparative effectiveness analysis.105
In 2009, when the Obama Administration came into office, the White
House added to pressure on the FDA when it promulgated with some fanfare
an “Open Government” Directive.  The FDA responded by setting up a
Transparency Task Force.106  On the question of clinical trial data, this Task
Force proposed to
convene a group of internal and external stakeholders to discuss the possible
uses of non-summary safety and effectiveness data from product applica-
tions, the circumstances under which it would be appropriate for sponsors to
disclose non-summary safety and effectiveness data from applications submit-
ted to FDA, and if appropriate, the format and the method by which disclo-
sure should occur.107
Whether this group was ever convened is unclear.
101 Id.
102 Marc A. Rodwin & John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Data as a Public Good, 308 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 871, 872 (2012).  Of course, patient-level data raises privacy and informed con-
sent challenges.
103 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws and Secrecy in
Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483 (2007);
Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing
Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (1980).
104 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 472–73; Mustafa U¨nlu¨, Note, It Is Time: Why the
FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 511,
537–41 (2010).
105 Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Access to Patient-Level Trial Data—A Boon to Drug Developers,
369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1577, 1577 (2013).
106 See WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41361, THE OBAMA ADMINISTRA-
TION’S OPEN GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2–3 (2011); FDA Transparency
Initiative Overview, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transpar
ency/TransparencyInitiative/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
107 TRANSPARENCY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA TRANS-
PARENCY INITIATIVE: DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT REGARDING DISCLOSURE POLI-
CIES OF THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 7 (2010), https://www.fda.gov/down
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Meanwhile in Europe, the controversy over clinical trial data release was
becoming quite heated.  In June 2007, researchers from Norway associated
with the Cochrane group—a collaboration of medical researchers based
largely outside the United States who do not take money from pharmaceuti-
cal firms—had requested from the EMA CSRs for fifteen placebo-controlled
trials on two anti-obesity drugs.108  Their goal was “to study selective publica-
tion by comparing protocols and unpublished results with those in published
reports.”109  Over the next three years, the EMA resisted the researchers’
requests by citing, inter alia, protection of commercially confidential informa-
tion (CCI) and the administrative burden involved.110  The researchers
responded by filing a complaint with the European Ombudsman, who found
that the reports did not contain CCI, and issued a June 2010 statement casti-
gating the EMA.111  In August 2010, the EMA reversed position, stating that
it would grant access to the reports.112
Three months later, in November 2010, the EMA also announced a
more general policy stating (in line with the Ombudsman’s recommenda-
tion) that it would make CSR data on drugs for which a final decision has
been made available on request.113  Between 2010 and 2013, the EMA
received 750 requests for document access, and it granted access to over two
million pages of documents.114  Having decided to release data, the EMA
then stood by its decision in the face of lawsuits by originator firms.
The initial EMA decision catalyzed a series of events that created further
momentum in favor of data release.  As a consequence of the new EMA pol-
icy, another group of Cochrane researchers were able to obtain CSRs for the
prominent antiviral drug Tamiflu from the EMA.  Based on these CSRs,
which amounted to tens of thousands of pages, the researchers published a
series of papers asserting that much of the information about Tamiflu con-
tained in previously published papers was incorrect or misleading.115
In a 2012 Policy Forum published in the Public Library of Science: Medicine,
these Cochrane researchers summarized their findings and placed them in
the context of the larger debate by noting that further study of unpublished
clinical trial data had also “radically changed public knowledge of safety and
loads/AboutFDA/Transparency/PublicDisclosure/GlossaryofAcronymsandAbbreviations/
UCM212110.pdf.
108 Peter C. Gøtzsche & Anders W. Jorgensen, Opening Up Data at the European Medicines
Agency, 342 BRITISH MED. J. d2686 (2011).
109 Id.
110 Id. at d2687.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at d2689.
114 Requests for clinical trial data in particular were most likely to come from the phar-
maceutical industry, academics, and law firms. See Sergio Bonini et al., Transparency and the
European Medicines Agency—Sharing of Clinical Trial Data, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2452, 2452
(2014).
115 See Peter Doshi et al., The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: Recommendations
From the Tamiflu Experience, 9 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2012) (listing papers).
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efficacy” for such important drugs as Avandia, Neurontin, and Vioxx.116
Notably, the EMA responded by agreeing.117  In that April 2012 document,
the EMA also indicated that it was moving towards proactive disclosure.118
In June 2013, the EMA released for public consultation a draft policy on
publication and access to CSR documents.  The most controversial aspect of
the policy has been what information the EMA will consider CCI, which it
allows to be redacted.  Since October 2014, when the EMA released the final
policy,119 it has also issued a number of detailed guidance documents on the
question.120
In general, the EMA has taken the position that most clinical trial data is
not CCI and that requests for redaction should therefore be limited and
should be justified through specific argument.  The EMA’s approach appears
measured and deliberate.  For example, the EMA has quite appropriately
specified that information regarding exploratory or secondary endpoints not
specifically targeted in the trial (and thus probably not already patented) can
be redacted.121  Allowing such redaction preserves the possibility that these
subsequent uses could be patented and then tested more systematically in the
future.122
116 Id. at 2.
117 See Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Open Clinical Trial Data for All? A View From Regulators,
9 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2012).
118 See id.
119 EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, EMA 240810/2013, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY POLICY
ON PUBLICATION OF CLINICAL DATA FOR MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN USE (2014) [here-
inafter OCTOBER 2014 POLICY], http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_libra
ry/Other/2014/10/WC500174796.pdf.
120 See, e.g., EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, EMA 90915/2016, EXTERNAL GUIDANCE ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY POLICY ON THE PUBLICATION OF
CLINICAL DATA FOR MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN USE (2016), http://www.ema.europa
.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Regulatory_and_procedural_guideline/2016/03/W
C500202621.pdf.
121 See OCTOBER 2014 POLICY, supra note 119, at 17–20.
122 In some cases, courts have held that the mere mention of a potential secondary use
in an article is sufficient to render the use unpatentable. See, e.g., MEHL/Biophile Int’l
Corp. v. Milgaum, 192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  The EMA discussion regarding redac-
tion of exploratory objectives specifically recognizes this possibility. See OCTOBER 2014 POL-
ICY, supra note 119, at 19 (“[E]xploratory objectives may include biomarkers that could be
used as ‘hypothesis generating’ for future studies.  At that stage there would not be enough
information to file patent applications on these objectives until some data are available
from clinical and non-clinical studies.  Disclosing these exploratory objectives may pre-
clude obtaining patents . . . .”).  Nicholson Price and Timo Minssen note these protections
but argue that the EMA policy may nonetheless render public and thus unpatentable “sec-
ondary effects of unrecognized importance.”  W. Nicholson Price & Timo Minssen, Will
Clinical Trial Data Disclosure Reduce Incentives to Develop New Uses of Drugs?, 33 NATURE
BIOTECH. 685, 686 (2015).  While it is possible that CSRs might contain stray observations
about secondary effects that go unrecognized even by the pharmaceutical firm that is
redacting the records, such failure to recognize potentially valuable information is not
likely to be pervasive.
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Under the policy, after the EMA has approved a drug for which a mar-
keting access application was received after January 1, 2015, associated CSRs
will be made available.123  The first CSRs released under this policy were
made available in late 2016.
Although the CSR data is being made available immediately upon drug
approval, jurisdictions with data exclusivity regimes will presumably not allow
it to be used to seek marketing approval until after the exclusivity period has
passed.  As further protection for originators, the EMA is watermarking the
data and also requiring those who download data to sign a contractual agree-
ment forbidding use of the data for marketing approval.  Of course, an EMA
policy that delayed data release until after a certain period of time had
elapsed post-approval would have further protected originator incentives.  As
the EMA monitors the effects of policy implementation, it should consider
whether adjustments to the data release timeline are appropriate.
The FDA has not matched the EMA’s flurry of activity.124  However,
absent evidence (which has yet to emerge) that drug makers are avoiding
seeking regulatory approval in Europe based on concerns about data release,
the FDA may not need to.  The EMA’s unilateral action creates a global pub-
lic good that does not have to be duplicated by the FDA.  More generally, the
EMA’s action highlights the extent to which, in certain contexts, unilateral
action by a single large regulator can set a global baseline.
The interest demonstrated by the EMA and FDA also appears to have
spurred private-sector collective action in the shadow of regulatory threat.
One of the most notable efforts is the Clinical Data Study Request (CDSR)
project, which makes anonymized individual patient data from thirteen origi-
nator firms available to researchers.  The project has its roots in an
announcement by GlaxoSmithKline in October 2012, in which the firm
stated its goal of seeing “a broad system develop where the clinical research
community can access data from trials conducted by different
organizations.”125
To be sure, the EMA has not yet tackled individual patient data, which
poses the biggest challenges with respect to privacy and consent.  That said,
the EMA decision to take on the data-release challenge in a stepwise fashion,
with the first step addressing aggregated data that presents fewer privacy con-
cerns, itself represents a lesson of sorts.  The EMA approach contrasts with
the sweeping decision taken by NIH to deem all genomic information identi-
123 See OCTOBER 2014 POLICY, supra note 119, at 6–8.
124 In 2013, the FDA did issue a request for comments on a proposal to release drug
trial data in “masked” form such that the sponsor of the drug(s) in question could not be
identified.  Although the FDA ultimately did not go forward on this proposal, it has
recently published some internal analyses that assess classes of drugs and also shed some
light on its approval process. See, e.g., Steven N. Goodman & Rita F. Redberg, Opening the
FDA Black Box, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 361 (2014).
125 Jennifer Bresnick, Big Pharma Opens Up Big Data for Clinical Trials, Analytics,
HEALTHITANALYTICS (July 23, 2014), http://healthitanalytics.com/news/big-pharma-
opens-up-big-data-for-clinical-trials-analytics.
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fiable, and require researchers who collect this information to obtain broad
consent for any secondary use.
The next Part discusses diagnostic testing data and lessons from
biopharmaceutical trial data that could be applied in that area.
III. DIAGNOSTIC TESTING DATA
Because the regulatory scheme governing diagnostics differs from that
governing therapeutics, this Part begins with a discussion of the basic regula-
tory scheme for diagnostics.
A. The Basic Regulatory Scheme
Since 1976, when it was given jurisdiction over medical devices, the FDA
has regulated as medical devices all diagnostic tests that are marketed as
kits.126  Thus, the FDA has test data on marketed kits.  In contrast, because
the FDA has exercised “enforcement discretion” over so-called laboratory-
developed diagnostic tests, or LDTs, it has LDT data only in those cases
where the firms or laboratories performing the LDT voluntarily seek regula-
tory approval.127
In recent years, the FDA has become quite concerned about the quality
of LDTs it does not regulate, particularly complex LDTs that rely on non-
transparent algorithms that analyze large amounts of genomic, proteomic,
and other biomarker data.  During the Obama Administration, it proposed
LDT regulation, emphasizing that the current regulatory scheme, under
which the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services assesses a test’s analyti-
cal validity under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments
(CLIA), does not assess the accuracy with which a test measures the presence
or absence of a particular clinical condition.128
More specifically, the FDA proposed a “risk-based” approach to the regu-
lation of laboratory-developed tests.129  Under this approach, “low-risk”
LDTs, LDTs for rare diseases and unmet needs, and “traditional LDTs” used
and interpreted directly by physicians and pathologists working within a sin-
gle institution responsible for patient care would be subject only to notifica-
tion and/or registration and listing, and adverse event reporting.130
Premarket approval (PMA) requirements would not apply.  For tests that
were found moderate- or high-risk, applicable requirements would depend
on whether the tests in question were considered to be the highest-risk (Class
126 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
127 Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests; Draft Gui-
dance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories; Availa-
bility, 79 Fed. Reg. 59,776, 59,778 (Oct. 3, 2014).
128 Id. at 59,776, 59,779.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 59,777.
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III) devices or more moderate-risk (Class II).131  According to the FDA, it was
particularly concerned about LDTs in three categories: those that use com-
plex, nontransparent algorithms; those that act like companion diagnostics—
that is, tests that claim to guide selection of therapy; and those that have the
same intended use as an FDA-approved medical device.132
The FDA’s work in this area followed a prominent IOM report, issued in
2012, that recommended that the FDA “develop and finalize a risk-based gui-
dance or regulation on bringing omics-based tests to FDA for review.”133
The IOM report also called for greater transparency in the data, metadata,
analysis plans, computer code, and computational procedures at issue in
complex genomics tests.
The FDA proposal for LDT regulation did not suggest, however, that the
agency would move to promote transparency of the underlying data it
receives from test developers.  Instead, the FDA would provide a summary
review of its approval determinations, as it does for all medical devices.134  As
medical devices, LDTs would also be subject to the various FDAAA require-
ments outlined in Part II.
B. Looking to the Future
The issue of data aggregation and transparency may come to a head in
the context of diagnostic tests, including LDTs, that produce data on genetic
variants.  For such tests, aggregation of variant data is essential for achieving
high-quality test interpretation.  Indeed, a July 2016 draft guidance from the
FDA specifically argues for development of “publicly accessible” genetic vari-
ant databases.135  As the draft guidance emphasizes, the diagnostic utility of a
specific class of LDTs—cutting-edge, next generation sequencing (NGS)
techniques—depends on the robustness of “genetic variant data aggrega-
tion.”136  The FDA states it will recognize these publicly accessible databases
“as sources of valid scientific evidence to support the clinical validity of geno-
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 COMM. ON THE REVIEW OF OMICS-BASED TESTS FOR PREDICTING PATIENT OUTCOMES IN
CLINICAL TRIALS, INST. OF MED., EVOLUTION OF TRANSLATIONAL OMICS: LESSONS LEARNED
AND THE PATH FORWARD 136 (Christine M. Micheel et al., eds. 2012) (emphasis omitted),
http://www.nap.edu/13297.
134 Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests; Draft Gui-
dance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories; Availa-
bility, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,352; see also BD. ON HEALTH SCI. POLICY, INST. OF MED., GENOME-
BASED DIAGNOSTICS: CLARIFYING PATHWAYS TO CLINICAL USE 8 (2012), http://www.nap
.edu/13359.
135 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USE OF PUBLIC HUMAN GENETIC VARIANT DATABASES TO
SUPPORT CLINICAL VALIDITY FOR NEXT GENERATION SEQUENCING (NGS)-BASED IN VITRO
DIAGNOSTICS: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR STAKEHOLDERS AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF 1 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGui
dance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM509837.pdf.
136 Id. at 2.
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type-phenotype relationships in FDA’s regulatory review of NGS-based
tests.”137
Assuming that it is finalized in the future, the FDA’s draft guidance may
provide some impetus for test developers to contribute their own variant data
to publicly accessible databases.  However, nothing in the FDA guidance sug-
gests that the agency will require test developers to contribute their data.138
Test developers could presumably free ride on public data for purposes of
making arguments to the FDA, while keeping their own data private.  Indeed,
commentators’ reaction to the draft guidance has focused on the dearth of
databases that currently meet the FDA standard.139  While NIH funding has
generated some public databases, most notably the ClinVar resource, more
funding will be needed to increase the number of variants of ClinVar, and for
further curation.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, NIH funding requirements now require
all researchers who generate genomic data to have obtained broad consent
ex ante to share any data, no matter now unlikely it is to be re-identified.140
As a consequence, prospects for rapid growth of ClinVar and other NIH-
funded databases through contributions by federally-funded researchers are
unclear.  More generally, proposed actions by the HHS Office of Human
Research to revise the Common Rule that governs all federally-funded
human-subjects research so as to require written consent for secondary
research on biospecimens141 will create challenges for data pooling.  These
include, for example, pooling efforts that may arise as a consequence of the
much-touted Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI)—an effort to track a vast
variety of health information, including genomic data, on one million partici-
pants.142  Notably, although the PMI was begun under the Obama Adminis-
tration, Congress recently passed legislation, the 21st Century Cures Act,
which provides robust funding well into the next administration.143
Perhaps not surprisingly, distinguished commentators like the NAS have
been quite critical of approaches that treat all research as human-subjects
research requiring ex ante consent.  A recent NAS report notes that the “sys-
tem may, for example, be better served by explicit sanctions against investiga-
tors and institutions seeking to re-identify biospecimen sources by any
method, including linkage of genomic sequence data to identifiers, rather
137 Id. at 1.
138 Turna Ray, FDA Plans to Use Public Genetic Variant Databases for NGS Test Regulation




140 See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.
141 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (2009).
142 See About the Precision Medicine Initiative, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://www.nih
.gov/research-training/allofus-research-program (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
143 Turna Ray, Cures Act Gives Precision Medicine Proponents, Diagnostics Companies Reasons
to Celebrate, GENOMEWEB (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diag-
nostics/cures-act-gives-precision-medicine-proponents-diagnostics-companies-reasons.
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than by redefining all research with de-identified biospecimens as human
subject research.”144  Ideally, HHS and its component institutions would
have more carefully analyzed the question of how to generate publicly acces-
sible databases.145
In fairness to the FDA, current law does not provide any regulatory data
exclusivity for FDA-approved diagnostic tests, or for medical devices more
generally.  Thus, the policy environment differs from drug trial data disclo-
sure.  But the precedent of biopharmaceutical clinical trial data, particularly
in Europe, suggests that a properly balanced approach to transparency of
FDA-regulated medical device data could involve a framework similar to that
provided by Hatch-Waxman.  For a specified period of time after the device’s
approval, data would be protected by exclusivity and perhaps even protected
from release.  After this time period, however, it would be available for aggre-
gation, with all the attendant benefits for patient health and future
innovation.
Because this properly balanced framework would require congressional
action, some might argue that it is a nonstarter.  But the 2017 change in
administration has already put congressional action on the agenda.  With the
change in administration, the FDA has indicated it will table its efforts to
finalize its LDT guidance.146  Many have argued that the FDA’s organic stat-
ute does not currently provide adequate regulatory authority, and have
threatened to sue if the FDA begins to enforce its proposal.147  Going for-
ward, therefore, Congress is the most likely possible venue for comprehen-
sive regulatory action on all diagnostic tests.
If and when Congress prescribes some type of regulatory approval
requirement for diagnostic tests that are not currently regulated, it should
strongly consider mechanisms by which the regulators’ role as a data aggrega-
tor could be exploited for future innovation.  To some extent, Congress has
already done that in the biopharmaceutical trial data context.  Moreover, as
the example of the EMA in the biopharmaceutical trial data context demon-
strates, action by just one large regulator suffices to create a global baseline
of data access.
144 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., OPTIMIZING, supra note 68, at 166; see also Contreras, supra
note 9.
145 For a wide-ranging argument that component agencies of HHS like the FDA and
NIH should coordinate to promote better health innovation policy, see Rachel Sachs,
Administering Health Innovation Policy (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
146 See Zachary Brennan, FDA Further Explains Delay on LDT Guidance, REG. AFF. PROFS.
SOC’Y (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2017/01/13/26608/
FDA-Further-Explains-Delay-on-LDT-Guidance/.
147 Gail Javitt, FDA Regulation of Laboratory Developed Tests: A Long Saga, LAW360 (Dec. 15,
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/873238/fda-regulation-of-laboratory-developed-
tests-a-long-saga.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s intervention in the Mayo and Myriad cases
addressed one type of legal overlap—adjacent and therefore arguably overly
robust rights held by a single entity.  But the diagnostic data fragmentation
that is exacerbated by these cases poses its own legal overlap challenge.  For
each diagnostic data silo, multiple legal claims and claimants must be
addressed to achieve the benefits of pooling.
Commentators who have discussed the data aggregation challenge have
generally focused on possibilities created through public funding, through
collective action by research participants, or through pressure by payers.
This Article has emphasized the important role of risk regulators, most nota-
bly the partial precedent offered by biopharmaceutical clinical trial data.  It
has also highlighted the challenges created by U.S. regulators’ decision to
require consent even for secondary research on data.
While U.S. risk regulators may have missed the mark on consent, the
FDA has taken some steps forward on biopharmaceutical data pooling.
Moreover, because data is a global public good, the actions of the EMA cre-
ate a global baseline for access.  The private-sector data pooling spurred by
threats of regulatory action is also a positive development.  Finally, in those
advanced economies that have such exclusivity, data exclusivity that runs con-
currently with any patents emerges as an attractive mechanism for balancing
the interests of initial and subsequent data generators.
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